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Thinking About Me
How Social Awareness Evolved
Julie J. Neiworth
Carleton College
ABSTRACT—Humans seem unique in their consideration
of others’ goals, motivations, intentions, and needs. But the
human form of social awareness did not spring from no-
where; certain mechanisms shared across primates formed
the foundation from which these processes derived. A re-
view of recent nonhuman primate research points to par-
ticular ancestral mechanisms, including an interest in
images moving in synchrony with self, a mirror neuron
system that responds in the same way to actions made by the
self and by others, and inherited social tolerance that
provided the bases for social thinking. Still there is a gap in
tracking social awareness from these basic beginnings to the
ability to think about self and other with respect to inten-
tions and goals. Comparative and clinical work will fill in
this gap and will map brain processes onto social thinking.
KEYWORDS—social awareness; tamarins; mirror neurons;
evolution
Humans have an awareness of me and you, of mine and yours,
of my actions and your actions, and of my intentions and your
intentions. It is likely that this kind of thinking, especially the
ability to take into account intentions and beliefs of others,
enabled us to use language more deliberately and intentionally,
to guide others toward a common purpose, and to conform
with others to form distinct societies and traditions. It has been
suggested that our complex social awareness makes us unique in
our thinking. But it is likely that a uniquely human ability did
not come from nowhere and that it has its foundations in brain
systems that humans share with other social animals, especially
nonhuman primates.
When comparisons are drawn between the social awareness of
nonhuman primates and that of humans, immediately apparent
are striking limits on the nonhuman primates’ side, includ-
ing lower rates of self-recognition; less shared attention with
others; fewer face-to-face interactions; less imitation; less use of
gestures and pointing; and shorter, more limited use of purposeful
language. But do these limitations suggest a fundamental differ-
ence in social thinking that evolved in hominids? There is no direct
way to determine what social-cognitive changes occurred in an-
cestral hominids, nor is it possible to assess social awareness by
watching what animals do—especially if we look for human-like
behaviors in nonhuman creatures rather than behaviors typical of
the animal. Still, careful testing in the laboratory is starting to
reveal the shared evolved social thinking of primates.
RECOGNIZING ME
One simple distinction that allows for social consideration is
differentiating self from other. By 24 months, most children
recognize themselves in mirrors and pass a ‘‘mark’’ test by
touching their own head upon seeing a surprising mark on their
head in the mirror. In fact, distinct brain activity corresponds
with self-recognition in humans: Viewing one’s own face con-
sistently stimulates particular areas in the right frontal and right
parietal lobes (Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007). These
areas overlap with areas containing mirror neurons, which fire
when one is performing an act and also when one is observing the
same act performed. Mirror neurons in these areas have been
noted to produce a higher rate of activation toward a mirror, most
likely because one would simultaneously be both observing and
making the action.
The only primates to show the proper behavior to indicate
mirror-generated self-awareness through the mark test with
proper controls are chimpanzees and orangutans, and this
finding defines an ape–monkey fundamental split in under-
standing ‘‘me.’’ There are recent documented demonstrations
of self-recognition in a few other mammals (elephants and dol-
phins), and one example in magpies, but because many of the
control conditions were not tested it is unclear whether these
cases really indicate self-awareness in those species given.
In human children, the ability to recognize self emerges
gradually over time, and developmental psychologists have
identified self-directed behaviors in infants too young to show
full-fledged mark-directed behavior. By approaching the ques-
tion comparatively in the same way as it has been studied
Address correspondence to Julie J. Neiworth, Department of Psy-
chology, Carleton College, Northfield, MN 55057; e-mail: jneiwort
@carleton.edu.
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
Volume 18—Number 3 143Copyright r 2009 Association for Psychological Science
developmentally, recent studies have shown that two species of
New World monkeys, cotton top tamarins (Neiworth, Anders, &
Parsons, 2001) and brown capuchins (de Waal, Dindo, Freeman,
& Hall, 2005), show a unique pattern of behaviors directed
toward their reflections: (a) increased looking and more eye
contact; (b) exploration of the mirror; and (c) contingency test-
ing, or swaying back and forth in the mirror, which generates
synchronous behavior in the reflection (see Fig. 1). Although one
could attribute the first two behaviors to interest in a shiny
object, contingency testing is a peculiar behavior only made in
front of a mirror. Moreover, the behaviors the monkeys express
toward strangers (taped or live) are markedly different from the
behaviors they express toward a mirror. Very young humans and
adult monkeys demonstrate a similar intermediate step to self-
recognition. The difference between apes (including humans)
and many species of monkeys, then, is not that one is aware of
self and the other is not. It is that apes eventually show a causal
understanding of their reflection in the mirror, with more overt
control over reactions to it, while monkeys show a reactive
process similar to that of young human infants—one that is
automatic, attention getting, and invoked by the synchronous
cues of a reflected image. Underlying all of this is likely to be a
system of mirror neurons engaged by reflections, or stimuli and
actions with synchronous connections to the self.
MY ACTIONS – YOUR ACTIONS
Mirror neurons were first discovered in rhesus monkeys, a variety
of macaques that do not show self-awareness in the mark test
(Gallup, 1977). Thus it is more likely that the mirror neuron system
evolved for other uses than self-representation and may have been
coopted to support that function in humans. One ability that was
likely made possible by mirror neurons is crude physical imitation,
or the act of copying a behavior that is being observed. Meltzoff and
Moore (1977) first showed that human infants as young as 2 weeks
old could imitate a mouth opening, a finger moving, or a tongue
sticking out. This suggested the existence of a special mechanism,
present from birth, that allows for crude imitation of others. We
now know that various monkey and ape babies also imitate facial
gestures and hand or paw gestures. In fact, mirror neurons in
rhesus monkeys in area F5, an area of the monkey premotor cortex,
and in humans in the ventral premotor cortex and the anterior
inferior parietal lobe fire selectively to identical actions made by
self or to the identical actions made by others, including reaching
for an object or cracking a peanut (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, &
Rizzolatti, 1996). Recently, this process has been suggested to
support shared emotions and empathy—for example emotional
contagion, wherein a group of babies cry once one starts, or when
a single monkey’s reactions spread across a group (see Decety &
Jackson, 2006, for a review).
In addition to low-level imitation such as contagion, imitation
can occur on a conscious level in humans when we choose between
it and other strategies for success. In a recent study, McGuigan,
Whiten, Flynn, and Horner (2007) found that children aged 3 and
5 will copy the exact actions of a model who demonstrates how
to open a box to obtain a treat, even when some of the actions
are irrelevant to the goal; thus children are choosing to copy ex-
actly as a strategy. Adult chimpanzees, in contrast, delete needless
behavioral steps if they are not causally related to obtaining the
goal, and thus show ‘‘emulation’’ rather than imitation (Horner &
Whiten, 2005). Even when chimpanzees watch other chimpan-
zees, they do not copy their actions exactly; rather, they select
observed behaviors that are more likely to solve the problem. There
is a social crux to chimpanzee emulation, though: If a hidden ex-
perimenter shows the way to open a box via a transparent string—
and thus there is no animate social agent present—a chimpanzee
is less likely to utilize the actions observed (see Whiten, 2008, for a
brief review).
Monkeys also profit from watching others. They show higher
frequencies of certain responses when they observe others perform
them, relative to the rate they would emit those responses other-
wise; they also pay more attention to particular objects that they
have observed other individuals interacting with, although they do
not copy others’ exact actions to achieve goals (for a review, see
Tomasello & Call, 1997). In sum, there is a low-level mechanism in
primates for copying automatically, which may explain contagion
and a directed focus toward certain areas and objects and
responses, and this mechanism is most likely linked to the mirror
neuron system. But the process of overt imitation as a chosen
strategy to solve certain problems is not shared. In nonhuman
primates, independent work toward the goal is more often the rule
than is purposeful imitation. In humans, imitation of the exact
behaviors is selected if copying will lead quickly to success.
Fig. 1. Caitlin, an adult cotton top tamarin, looks intently at her reflection.
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MINE, YOURS, AND OURS: COOPERATION
How social awareness and other forms of social thinking in-
cluding altruism and cooperation evolved is hard to fathom,
since survival seems intricately tied to individual survival.
However, in recent years there has been renewed interest in the
concept of evolution by group selection (Wilson & Wilson,
2007): Both within- and between-group selection occurs in na-
ture, and individuals may pass on traits that benefit the group
even if those traits do not literally support individual survival.
Traits that help the group as a whole help survival between
groups at the expense of certain individuals.
Is there evidence for inherited mechanisms that lead to co-
operation? Within monkey species, the likelihood of cooperat-
ing, or working together toward a common goal, seems predicted
by the inherited social tolerance of the species. Cotton top
tamarins and marmosets are cooperative breeders that need help
from others for rearing offspring, and they readily cooperate to
get food in laboratory experiments (Snowdon & Cronin, 2007). In
fact, Burkart, Fehr, Efferson, and van Schaik (2007) found that
marmosets pulled forward a tray to help a partner to obtain food
even when the helper did not get rewarded, and Cronin and
Snowdon (2008) found similar altruistic behavior in cotton top
tamarins. In contrast, more competitive and antagonistic species
who are not cooperative breeders, like Guinea baboons and
rhesus and Japanese macaques, fail to work together to find food.
It is possible that cooperation emerged in species like tamarins,
marmosets, and humans that breed cooperatively.
Cooperation has been demonstrated in the lab in certain pri-
mates that are noncooperative breeders (including capuchins and
chimpanzees), but there may be limits to their use of it. For in-
stance, chimpanzees can successfully pull ropes together to move
boxes to obtain food, but only after training (for example, with
various lengths of rope so that they learn that they need to pull
simultaneously to meet the goal; Hirata & Fuwa, 2007). And
chimpanzees have shown an indifference to helping partners to
acquire rewards (Silk et al., 2005). It seems likely that chimpan-
zees cooperate spontaneously when the behavior is part of a re-
ciprocal exchange, as happens in the wild with cooperative
hunting, but they do not readily apply it in other circumstances.
Cooperation in this species may have emerged due to other pres-
sures, such as competition over resources. Something completely
different may be true in cotton top tamarins; in a recent study in our
lab (Greenberg & Neiworth, 2008), cotton top tamarins were found
to cooperate to pull felt ropes together to move an apparatus to
obtain a cereal treat (see Fig. 2), but the rate at which they coop-
erated actually decreased significantly when competition was in-
troduced (for example, when otherunrelated tamarins wereclose to
them, or worse, when other unrelated tamarins could participate in
the same task by pulling the apparatus toward them and away from
the other group). In competitive circumstances, cotton top tama-
rins were not motivated to cooperate. They cooperated more
readily in noncompetitive or prosocial circumstances.
Cooperation may also spring from variations in gene expres-
sion in mammals. Hammock and Young (2005) studied two
species of a rodent, prairie and montane voles, and found that a
long allele in a repetitive DNA sequence in the prairie vole’s
vasopressin receptor gene avpr1a correlated with an increase in
social behaviors and tolerance in males in particular, including
more grooming of the young, more tolerance of others’scents, and
a stronger partner attachment. In contrast, the montane vole
male does not pair bond, does not contribute to parenting, and
does not differentiate partners well, and it has a very short ver-
sion of the genetic expression of the vasopressin 1a receptor. The
authors found that a similar sequence that appears in humans in
the avpr1a gene sequence is deleted in chimpanzees, suggesting
a biological difference that may lead to differences in social
tolerance and prosocial behaviors like cooperation between
chimpanzees and humans.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
It turns out that no primate is an island entire of itself. But to
understand the influence of others on primates and their think-
ing, we need to determine the relative contribution of thinking
about me and you, mine and yours, and our intentions and goals.
Research suggests shared ancestral processes that set the stage
for different levels of social awareness: (a) interest in images that
move synchronously with one’s own body, demonstrated in var-
ious New World monkey species as well as apes; (b) crude imi-
tation found in primates, presumably supported by mirror
neurons; (c) cooperative breeding, which correlates well with
cooperation and altruism in a few New World monkey species
Fig. 2. Wizard, an adult cotton top tamarin, looks for her partner before
starting to pull a felt rope in a cooperation task.
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and in humans; (d) competition over resources and group dy-
namics, which may lead to limited uses of cooperation by species
such as brown capuchins and chimpanzees; and (e) social tol-
erance, supported by particular gene expression that may lead to
increased social behaviors in various mammals. Each of these
processes demands further study in primates, to clarify the in-
fluence of each on social thinking. The five components identi-
fied here suggest evolved social awareness in a variety of primate
species, based on particular neural mechanisms, and passed on
due to different group pressures. How then did we humans
evolve to experience full-blown expressions of self-awareness, of
overt imitation, and of intentional cooperation? Are we unique in
showing all five of these components and coopting other cogni-
tive processes to make subjective sense of them?
With the precursors to these processes slowly becoming
known, we should soon be able to piece together how social
awareness evolved and how it is supported by various brain
processes. Animal models of social thinking are just recently
illuminating how particular clinical syndromes with social
deficits may have come to be. For example, Khaitovich et al.
(2008) examined changes that occurred across various primates
and found that the expression levels of many genes and metab-
olites that are altered in schizophrenia also changed rapidly
during evolution. This suggests that schizophrenia may be a by-
product of increased metabolic demands on the brain as it
evolved. It is increasingly becoming clear that autistic humans
perceive faces in a more piecemeal fashion and perceive objects
less globally, or less by overall shape; they also rely less on cues
for the grouping of features, such as similarity and proximity.
These idiosyncracies seem similar to the perception of certain
species of nonhuman primates (Neiworth, Gleichman, Olinick,
& Lamp, 2006). This connection with a primate model suggests
that the perceptual and social deficits of autism may be a cost of
diminished connectivity among brain systems, which occurred
in some primate species when evolution favored more modular
brain processing. A focus on the study of autism and models of
autism in primates should help to illuminate neural processing
that allows for social thinking. By tracking social processes like
these biologically, comparatively, and clinically, a brain model
of human social thinking should emerge.
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